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As the nations of Islam become more active in world politi-
cal and economic affairs, Islamic law will inevitably interact
more frequently with other legal systems. There has already
developed a long relationship between Islamic law and Euro-
pean legal systems. A vital amalgam of Anglo-Muhummadan
law has long been in place in the Indian sub-continent.1 The
French attempted a similar melding in northwest Africa.2 In
the twentieth century, Islamic states themselves began ab-
sorbing the legal norms and legal codes of Europe. Today,
most Islamic states possess a legal system which is mostly
European.'
Contact and interaction with the American legal system has
also begun. Uncounted numbers of contracts have been signed
between Islamic states and American companies resulting in
the employment of thousands of American workers.4 Some of
the inevitable disputes which have arisen have found their
way into American courts for adjudication. In many cases,
American courts are asked to interpret Islamic norms, for Is-
lamic components remain in the legal systems of many Middle
* This article partly results from a paper given at the Conference on Politics and
Law in the Middle East, Columbia University, May 20-23, 1980, directed by Professor
Daisy Dwyer, and partly from an address to the Islamic Law Colloquium, Harvard
Law School, April 1979, directed by John Makdisi, now Professor at Cleveland-
Marshall College of Law.
** Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State Univer-
sity. A.B., Harvard University; M.A., University of Manchester; Ph.D., University of
Toronto; J.D., Columbia University School of Law.
1. J. SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 94-96 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
SCHACHT]
2. Id. at 97-99.
3. See N. ANDERSON, LAW REFORM IN THE MUSLIM WORLD (1976) [hereinafter cited
as ANDERSON].
4. As long ago as 1953, 8,000 Americans were reported to be living and working in
Saudi Arabia. Hart, Application of Hanbalite and Decree Law to Foreigners in
Saudi Arabia, 22 Gao. WASH. L. REV. 165 (1953).
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Eastern and Asian states.5 At least one legal system, the Saudi
Arabian, is primarily Islamic, and many other states are con-
sidering re-introducing the principles of classical Islamic law
(the sharid) into their legal systems.
When looking at the relationship between Islamic law and
American law within the United States one must understand
that, to the extent that it is recognized, Islamic law operates
within the context of a fundamentally different legal system.
The manner in which American courts are able to compre-
hend, articulate, and enforce Islamic norms in the milieu of
American jurisprudence is a difficult but interesting issue.
Foreign law arises in American courts when one of the par-
ties before it claims a legal right arising from either a foreign
law or from a properly decided foreign judgement.7 Absent a
treaty there is no obligation on the part of American courts to
legitimate or enforce foreign law or judgments.8 Yet when
5. See, e.g., Carroll, Muslim Family Law in South Asia: The Right to Avoid an
Arranged Marriage Contracted During Minority, 23 J. INDIAN L. INSTITUTE 149
(1981); Kourides, The Influence of Islamic Law on Contemporary Middle Eastern
Systems: The Formation and Binding Force of Contracts, 9 COLUM. J. TEANSNAT'L L.
384 (1970); Bartholomew, The Application of Shari'a in Singapore, 13 Am. J. Coup.
L. 385 (1964); Comment, Human Rights Practices in the Arab States: The Modern
Impact of Shari'a Values, 12 GEo. J. INrr'L & Coup. L. 55 (1982).
For a general survey of the legal systems in the Middle East which retain an Is-
lamic content in varying degrees, see H. LIEBESNY, THE LAW OF THE NEAR & MIDDLE
EAST 129-267 (1975) [hereinafter cited as LEESNY].
6. Vicker, Islam's Revival Spreads Use of the Shari'a Law, Wall St. J., May 11,
1979, at 18, col.4; Hill, Comparative and Historical Study of Modern Middle Eastern
Law, 26 Am. J. Comp. L. 279, 294 (1978).
For an analysis of the resurgence of Islamic law in Pakistan, see Esposito, Perspec-
tives on Islamic Law Reform: The Case of Pakistan, 13 J. INT'L L. & POLrICS 217
(1980). Pressures for a return to Islamic law are present in Egypt. Forte, Egyptian
Land Law: An Evaluation, 26 Am. J. Coup. L. 273 (1978); O'Kane, Islam in the New
Egyptian Constitution: Some Discussions in Al-Akram, 26 MIDDLE E. J. 137 (1972).
A specialized study of the modern law controlling sexual activities is found in Mayer,
Libyan Legislation in Defense of Arabo-Islamic Sexual Mores, 28 Am. J. Comp. L.
287 (1980).
Of course, revolutionary Iran has trumpeted its return to Islamic values, but little
is known of the actual legal structure there at the present time. For a criticism of
Iran's justice system as violating Islamic legal principles, see Ottley, The Revolution-
ary Courts of Iran: Islamic Law or Revolutionary Justice? 4 NEWSLETTER OF INT'L L.
1 (1980).
7. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 (1971).
8. Commercial Insurance Co. v. Pacific-Peru Construction Co., 558 F.2d 948, 952
(9th Cir. 1977).
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American courts recognize foreign law, they have traditionally
done so on grounds of comity.9 Although the term "comity"
has been used for decades, it remains a remarkably vague con-
cept.10 It is certain that a claimant cannot demand the recog-
nition of foreign law as a matter of right." Rather, domestic
courts apply principles of comity and recognize foreign law as
a matter of custom.1
The choice of law rules of the forum hearing the case will
determine the application of comity. Whether the forum oper-
ates under the older lex loci delicti formula, or under the
modern contacts or interest analysis, the forum will decline to
recognize the foreign law if it comes from an "uncivilized" le-
gal system, if it is contrary to domestic public policy or good
morals, or if the foreign judgement was reached without re-
9. See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1894); J. Zeevi & Sons, Ltd. v. Grindlays
Bank (Uganda), Ltd., 37 N.Y.2d 220, 371 N.Y.S.2d 892, 333 N.E.2d 168, cert. denied,
423 U.S. 866 (1975).
10. "Comity. . . is not a rule of law, but one of practice, convenience, and expedi-
ency. Although more than mere courtesy and accommodation, comity does not
achieve the force of an international imperative .... " Somportex Ltd. v. Philadel-
phia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1017 (1972). A number of considerations compel the application of comity: 1) mutual
interest and convenience; 2) the necessity to do justice and 3) the traditional adher-
ence to comity by other civilized nations. See Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 152 (2d
Cir. 1960); McFarland v. McFarland, 179 Va. 418, 19 S.E.2d 77, 83 (1942).
11. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1894).
12. One noted case held that comity is granted on the basis of reciprocity, such
that if the foreign nation grants legitimacy to our court decisions, our courts in turn
will grant legitimacy to foreign court decisions under the doctrine of res judicata.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1894). The Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sab-
batino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), limited the doctrine of reciprocity to the enforcement of
certain foreign court judgments and refused to extend the principle to a foreign gov-
ernment's capacity to sue in United States courts. 376 U.S. at 411-412. However,
most authorities deny that the basis of comity is on reciprocity even in court judg-
ments. See Bata v. Bata, 163 A.2d 493 (Del. 1960)(reciprocity rejected as basis for
enforcing judgement rendered against party who was not U.S. citizen), cert. denied,
366 U.S. 964 (1961); Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Trans Atlantique, 242 N.Y.
381, 152 N.E. 121, 123 (1926) (foreign judgement applied, "not on the basis of reci-
procity, but rather upon the persuasiveness of the foreign judgement."). See gener-
ally 2 BATI CoNMCT OF LAws 1381-89 (1935); RESTATEMwxr (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAws § 98 comment e (1971); Reese, The Status in This Country of Judgments
Rendered Abroad, 50 COLUM. L. Rzv. 783, 790-93 (1950). Most assert that the recog-
nition of a foreign judgement depends on the need to give justice to the party before
the court. Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Trans Atlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E.
121 (1926).
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gard to fundamental notions of due process.18 Such arguments
have been raised against recognizing the law of an Islamic
nation.1 '
13. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202 (1894); see REsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWS § 98 (1971); Reese, The Status in This Country of Judgments Ren-
dered Abroad, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 783, 795-96 (1950).
The concerns for protecting the rights of parties and the public policies of the fo-
rum state resulted in the universally accepted rule that penal statutes would not be
forced outside the jurisdiction enacting them. James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v.
Harry, 273 U.S. 119, 125 (1926); Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1887).
14. See, e.g., Walton v. Arabian Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1955). In Cooley v.
Weinberger, 398 F. Supp. 479 (E.D. Okla. 1974), affd, 518 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1975),
claimant had been denied insurance benefits under the Social Security Act because
she had been convicted of the felonious homicide of her husband by an Iranian court.
398 F. Supp. at 482. Claimant and her husband were American citizens living in Iran
in connection with her husband's employment there. The claimant asserted that fun-
damental norms of due process were not followed by the Iranian authorities during
her imprisonment and during her trial. She claimed that she had waited eleven
months in prison before trial, that Iranian authorities had interrogated her in all
night sessions and subjected her to torture. Hearing Transcript at 189, 198, 202. At
her trial in Iran, Mrs. Cooley made a claim of self-defense but the Iranian court did
not accept her version of the facts. Letter from Dr. Ebrahim Paad (attorney for de-
fendant in Iran) to attorney for claimant in United States, January 15, 1972. In her
testimony before the hearing officer, Mrs. Cooley asserted that she had complained to
American embassy officials about her husband's drunkenness and his threats to her
but that both the embassy officials and Iranians who worked with her husband said
that because of Islamic mores, the police would not take any action on behalf of a
wife against her husband. Mrs. Cooley believed the Iranian court operated under the
same prejudice.
In concluding that the laws of Iran afforded sufficient procedural guarantees to
Mrs. Cooley, the administrative hearing judge stated that Iran's "criminal process
(was] similar to that in the United States ... although procedurally and substan-
tively different from the United States federal system." In re Cooley, Hearing Deci-
sion December 15, 1972 at 42. The District Court found that the Treaty of Amity,
Economic Relations and Consular Rights between Iran and the United States, 8
U.S.T. 901 (1955), established United States recognition that judicial procedure in
Iran is according to the course of a civilized jurisprudence likely to secure an impar-
tial administration of justice. Cooley, 398 F. Supp. at 485 (1974). The court of appeals
opined that "Mrs. Cooley's testimony before the administrative law judge constitutes
a rather severe indictment of the Iranian legal system," although the court deferred
to the finding of the administrative judge presuming that he had not found claimant's
testimony credible. Cooley, 518 F.2d 1151, 1155 (1975).
In Miltenberg & Samton, Inc. v. Mallor, 1 A.D. 2d 458, 151 N.Y.S.2d 748 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1956), defendant had sold mislabeled canned herring to a knowing plaintiff
who in turn sold it to an Egyptian distributor for resale in Egypt. Plaintiff had ob-
tained a guarantee from the defendant insuring the plaintiff against all losses should
the herring be discovered to be mislabelled. After delivery, the Egyptian customer
refused payment to plaintiff asserting that Egyptian regulations forbade mislabelling.
Plaintiff sought to recover on the guarantee by defendant. Id. at 749-50.
Both plaintiff and defendant briefed arguments on whether Egyptian law forbade
the sale of mislabelled foodstuffs. Brief for Appellant, at 10-14; Brief for Respondent,
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The proof of foreign law in American courts has changed
over recent decades. Formerly domestic courts regarded for-
eign law as a question of fact for determination by the jury."
Consequently, the courts applied multiple laws of evidence
and the jury was responsible for determining the content of
the law of the foreign jurisdiction. For many courts the jury's
determination could not be overturned unless the decision was
clearly erroneous.'6 A confusing array of issues, concepts, evi-
dentiary rules, and authorities faced a judge and jury in deter-
mining the law of any foreign jurisdiction.17 As we shall see,
Islamic law presents peculiar difficulties even for judges, let
alone the typical juror.
New rules of civil procedure replaced the older view that
foreign law must be proven as a question of fact. Today, rules
allow both state and federal courts to take judicial notice of
foreign law and to treat such notice of foreign law as a legal
ruling subject to full review by the appellate courts. s New
York's civil practice law (CPLR), Rule 4511, permits New
York courts to take judicial notice of the law of foreign coun-
tries.' e In fact, the rule states that "judicial notice shall be
at 18-19. The New York court, however, found the substantive law of Egypt irrele-
vant, for New York public policy could not countenance such an agreement. Mallor,
151 N.Y.S.2d at 751 (1956). "ITIhe practice contemplated by the parties' agreement
is so grossly corrupt that it must carry universal condemnation," the court declared.
Id. at 752.
15. Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 and the "Fact" Approach to Determining Foreign
Law: Death Knell for a Die-Hard Doctrine, 65 MIcH. L. Rzy. 615, 617 (1967) [herein-
after cited as Miller]. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. International Ry. Co., 252 N.Y. 127, 169
N.E. 112 (1929) (law of Ontario established by jury, but construction of interpreta-
tion of law to be determined by court). See generally R. ScmHsxEoMG, Coan'ARiM
LAw 47-49 (3d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as ScmzsmmN].
16. Miller, supra note 15, at 623. Prior to the adoption of Federal Rule 44.1, even
some federal courts of appeals would reverse a factfinder's determination of foreign
law only if "clearly erroneous" within the meaning of Federal Rule 52(a). Miller,
supra note 15, at 689-90; see FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1, 52(a).
17. Miller, supra note 15, at 620-23. The requirement that foreign law be proved as
a question of fact, when combined with the lex loci premise, could result in a dismis-
sal of the suit. If the party relying on foreign law for the vindication of his rights was
unable to present sufficient proof of the foreign law to the trier-of-fact, the party's
case was dismissed for failure to prove a necessary, material fact. See, e.g., Cuba R.R.
v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473 (1912) (employee's action against employer for injuries sus-
tained in Cuba dismissed upon plaintiff's failure to establish applicable Cuban law).
18. Fan. R. Civ. P. 44.1.
19. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. R. 4511 (McKinney 1974). This rule, enacted in 1962, incorpo-
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taken" of foreign law if a party has given notice that it wishes
to plead foreign law and has given the court sufficient infor-
mation "to implement the request. 2 In addition, under
CPLR 3016(e), a party relying on foreign law for its cause of
action or for its defense must plead the substance of the for-
eign law.21 The comment to CPLR 3016 suggests plausibly
that a pleading to the court would necessarily satisfy the req-
uisite criteria to compel judicial notice under CPLR 4511(b).2
The comment, however, is clearly wrong. Even though New
York law seems to require a court to notice foreign law when a
party submits sufficient evidence, the courts have always been
permitted to determine whether or not the parties have in-
deed provided sufficient information.2 Thus, despite the com-
pulsory wording of the rule, judicial notice of foreign law re-
mains discretionary in New York courts. The practice of most
New York judges is still to treat the proof of foreign law simi-
lar to that of a question of fact by requiring pleadings and
testimony and by applying many of the rules of evidence. 4
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are far less ambiva-
lent. Rule 44.1 allows courts to take judicial notice of foreign
law and provides that any form of reasonable notice to the
court will be sufficient to raise foreign law questions.25 In ad-
dition, Rule 44.1 permits courts to consider any relevant ma-
terial or source of foreign law, whether or not submitted by a
party, even if such materials are otherwise inadmissible under
the Federal Rules of Evidence.2 6 The purposes of the rule
were to remove all unreasonable limitations from the judicial
quest to find the foreign law, and to treat the court's determi-
rates §344-a of the 1943 N.Y. Civil Practice Act, but requires, rather than permits,
the court to take judicial notice of the law of foreign states. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. R. 4511
(Leg. Stud. & Rep'ts) (McKinney 1974).
20. Id.
21. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. R. 3016(e) (McKinney 1974).
22. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. R. 3016, Comment e, § 3016:8 (McKinney 1974).
23. Petition of Petrol Shipping Corp., 37 F.R.D. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (difficulties in
language, insufficient assistance of counsel were sufficient to persuade the court not to
take judicial notice of Greek law as matter of discretion), afl'd, 360 F.2d 103, cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966).
24. In re Strauss's Estate, 75 Misc.2d 454, 347 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1973).
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1.
26. Id.
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nation of foreign law as a question of law, not one of fact."'
Prior to the adoption of Rule 44.1, federal courts followed
the method, with certain exceptions, of proving foreign law
which was present in the state where the particular federal
court sat.2" Courts ordinarily treated foreign law as an issue of
fact unless state law provided for judicial notice of foreign
law.2 ' Federal Rule 44.1 has displaced all state procedural
rules concerning proof of foreign law in federal actions leaving
proof of foreign law free of the restraints of the Erie
doctrine.80
There is evidence that Federal Rule 44.1 was designed to
allow federal court judges to act in the same manner as their
civilian counterparts in Europe.81 For the most part, however,
federal judges have eschewed the opportunity to take upon
themselves the responsibility of finding the relevant foreign
law." Federal courts have preferred to allow the litigants to
prove the foreign law through the testimony of expert wit-
nesses, although trial judges often take a vigorous role in ex-
amining the witnesses. Indeed, federal judges are necessarily
dependent on expert testimony, so that if it seems inadequate,
the judge may criticize a party for its lack of aid to the
court.8s In addition, federal judges feel much more confident
of their decisions when the foreign law is expressed in the
form of statutes, codes, or legal decisions, rather than upon
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1 (Advisory Committee's note). Miller, supra note 15, at 646.
28. Miller, supra note 15, at 649-56; see, e.g., Petition of Petrol Shipping Corp., 37
F.R.D. 437 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
29. Miller, supra note 15, at 655.
30. Miller, supra note 15, at 715-31.
31. Miller, supra note 15, at 661. See generally Sommerich & Busch, The Expert
Witness and the Proof of Foreign Law, 38 CoRmmL L.Q. 125 (1953). The authors of
this article review the European antecedents to Section 344-a of the New York Civil
Practice Act (1942). Id. at 128, 133. That statute, which preceded Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1,
allowed trail courts to exercise discretionary powers and to take judicial notice of
foreign law. Id. at 133.
32. Miller, supra note 15, at 660; see, e.g., Bartsch v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc.,
391 F.2d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 1968) (relying on RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) oF Corwicrs op
LAws § 136, comment h (1971)).
33. Bostroni v. Seguros Tepeyac, S.A., 225 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Tex. 1963) (plaintiff
criticized for using law librarian born in Germany to explain Mexican law), modified,
347 F.2d 168 (5th Cir. 1968); see infra text accompanying notes 181- 90 (use of expert
witness).
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interpretive writings of jurists.'4
Although proof of foreign law is now more commonly
treated as an issue of law and not one of fact, courts will usu-
ally agree to abide by the stipulation of the parties as to what
the foreign law is, particularly in contract disputes.3' In the
absence of stipulation, however, courts must determine which
party has the burden of proving foreign law. Some courts hold
that the party whose cause of action or defense depends on
the foreign law must shoulder the burden of proof." Other
courts hold that the party who contends that the applicable
foreign law is different from domestic law must bring forward
the proof.'7
34. See, e.g., First National City Bank v. Compania de Aguaceros, 398 F.2d 779
(5th Cir. 1968). In that case, based on testimony presented by Panamanian legal ex-
perts, the trail court refused to apply a harsh Panamanian banking statute on the
ground that it was ambiguous. The appellate court reversed this decision and applied
the harsh statutory language. Id. at 785.
The remaining problem is what to do when foreign law is insufficiently pleaded in
court. When the proof of the foreign law was treated as a fact, the failure to plead it
often led to dismissal of a plaintiff's case. Miller, supra note 15, at 633, noting Cuba
R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473 (1912) (suit for personal injury dismissed for failure to
establish relevant Cuban law). However, alternative results can occur when proof of
foreign law is an issue of law:
1. The court can presume in the absence of proof of foreign law that "the law
to be applied is the same as that of the forum." Note, Presumptions as to For-
eign Law: How They Are Affected by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1, 10
WASHBURN L.J. 296, 298 (1971).
2. The court can presume that the parties have tacitly agreed to abide by the
law of the forum. Miller, supra note 15, at 637.
3. The court can presume that the law is the same in the foreign jurisdiction as
in the home forum. Id. at 635.
4. The court can choose to apply "universally recognized fundamental princi-
ples." SCHLESINGER, supra note 15, at 153. See Schlesinger, A Recurrent Problem
in Transnational Litigation: The Effect of Failure to Invoke or Prove Applica-
ble Foreign Law, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1973).
35. SCHESLINGER, supra note 15, at 70-71.
36. SCHESLINGER, supra note 15, at 168.
37. Miller, supra note 15, at 697. In the former situation, the case may logically be
dismissed if proof is insufficient; in the latter, the forum's law may logically be ap-
plied if proof is insufficient. One New York case holds that if the cause of action on
which the plaintiff bases his claim is one which would create an obligation under the
law of any civilized country, the defendant must show that the foreign law is different
from American law. On the other hand, if the plaintiff alleges a cause of action which
is dissimilar to commonly accepted views, the plaintiff must show that this dissimilar
cause of action is valid under foreign law. Arams v. Arams, 182 Misc. 328, 335, 45
N.Y.S.2d 251, 257 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1943).
Professor Schlesinger suggests a multi-factored analysis in determining whether to
ISLAMIC LAW
II. ATTITUDES To ISLAMIC LAW
With this as background, we may now examine the manner
in which American courts have recently interpreted the con-
tract and tort law of Islamic countries. One might presume
that American courts would be hesitant to apply Islamic law
because of an implicit viewpoint that Islamic law was some-
how less civilized than Western law. In fact, early authorata-
tive writings in this country tended to equate Islam with pa-
ganism. For example, during the ratification debate in the
North Carolina convention, James Iredell, later to become a
justice of the United States Supreme Court, objected to those
who feared that representatives to the new Federal Congress
might not be men of Christian temperament." Iredell said
that a number of delegates were afraid that the people might
"choose representatives who have no religion at all, and that
pagans and Mahometans might be admitted into offices." 3 ' To
that objection, Iredell rejoined: "But how was it possible to
exclude any set of men, without taking away the principle of
religious freedom which we ourselves so warmly contend
for? 40
Similarly, Professor Cooley's classic book on constitutional
limitations notes that the Christian background to the United
States Constitution has an allowable effect on the secular soci-
ety, despite the constitutional protections of freedom of reli-
gion and separation of church and state. 1 Cooley declares
dismiss the case or apply the forum's law where a party has not sufficiently pleaded
the foreign law. SCHLESINGER, supra note 15, at 168-69. The factors he suggests are: a)
the degree to which the dispute involves a strong public interest, such as matrimonial
disputes; b) the nature of the issue, i.e., whether the issue is of a fundamental nature
seemingly shared by all civilized nations; and c) the nature of the foreign legal qys-
tern, i.e., if it is a common law system, one may more correctly assume that its law is
similar to United States law on basic points; d) the party's access to foreign law
materials; and e) the presence or absence of forum-shopping, i.e., the need to prevent
the plaintiff from simply choosing a forum whose law is sympathetic to his case.
SCHLESINGER, supra note 15, at 168-69.
38. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.10 (1961) (quoting 4 J. ELLIOT, DE-
BATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTI-
TUYTION 194 (2d ed. 1941)).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Doremus v. Board of Education, 5 N.J. 435, 448, 75 A.2d 880, 886 (N.J. 1950)
1983]
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that there are certain practices which our society may regard
as offensive because of our moral background even though in
"a Mahometan or pagan country [they] might be passed by
without notice, or even regarded as meritorious."4
In addition, American judges have sometimes suffered
under a simplistic notion of the nature of Islamic adjudica-
tion. In his dissent in Terminiello v. Chicago,'4 Justice Frank-
furter decried the majority's propensity to find a federal claim
where none had been pleaded in the lower state courts. "This
is a court of review," he declared, "not a tribunal unbounded
by rules. We do not sit like a kadi under a tree dispensing
justice according to considerations of individual expedi-
ency.""' Similarly, the Second Circuit once fought against its
conscience by stating: "[I]ndeed, if we were dispensing Cadi
justice, we would be disposed to rule in defendant's favor.
However, the limited scope of judicial review under the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act forbids our doing so."'" The Ninth Cir-
cuit also disparaged one plaintiff's argument finding it based
only upon an "abstract theory of justice which might be enter-
tained by an oriental cadi."'46
In point of fact, however, American judges have never held
that Islamic legal principles were "uncivilized" and therefore
not amenable to enforcement in American courts. 7 As will be
shown below, what most prevents application of Islamic law in
American jurisdictions is the fear the American judges have in
confronting a different legal system of apparently baffling
complexity.
Over the past few years, a pattern has developed in the way
American courts handle issues of foreign law when dealing
(quoting 2 T. COOLEY, CONSTrTIONAL LImrrATIONS 966 (8th ed. 1927)).
42. Id.
43. 377 U.S. 1 (1949).
44. Id. at 11 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
45. Boston and Maine Corp. v. Illinois C. R.R. Co., 396 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1968).
46. Colonial Trust Co. v. Goggin, 230 F.2d 634, 636 (9th Cir. 1955).
47. Walton v. Arabian American Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1956). In Walton,
the plaintiff, asserting that Saudi Arabia had no law or legal system, argued against
the application of the "laws" of Saudi Arabia on the basis that the country was unciv-
ilized. The court stated that it was "loath to and [would] not believe" that the Saudi
system was uncivilized, absent proof to the contrary. Id. at 545.
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with an Islamic nation. Where the foreign country has ab-
sorbed large amounts of European or common law principles
into its legal system, American courts have had little trouble
in applying the foreign law. On the other hand if Islamic prin-
ciples constitute a substantial portion of the law of the foreign
jurisdiction, the American court will find itself in an unfamil-
iar and complex environment. In such circumstances, it will
frequently seek to avoid the issue. 8 Whether or not the for-
eign country has absorbed large amounts of European or com-
mon law principles within its law, American courts still rely
on expert testimony to an extraordinary degree in deciding
the substance of the foreign law.' 9
III. APPLYING FOREIGN CONTRACT LAW
American courts seem to have the least difficulty in apply-
ing foreign contract law. Most Islamic countries have either
adopted codes, both civil and commercial, which mirror conti-
nental principles, or they have been influenced by the com-
mon law tradition.50 Since American courts have had long ex-
perience with contract disputes involving European and
English law, judges in the United States seem to display little
hesitation in applying the foreign substantive law of contracts.
Of course, it is possible that a European code adopted by an
Islamic country may contain Islamic glosses, nuances, and ele-
ments which escape the ken of a judge sitting in a court in the
United States. On the other hand, where it is evident that
there is indeed a mix of Western and Islamic legal systems,
48. See, e.g., Farmanfarmaian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 473 F. Supp. 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
aff'd, 588 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1978); Couch v. Mobil Oil Corp., 327 F. Supp. 897 (S.D.
Tex. 1971); infra text accompanying notes 61-70, 137-45.
49. See Alosio v. Iranian Shipping Lines, S.A., 426 F. Supp. 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)
(relying on defendant's expert witness to determine content of Iranian law), affd, 573
F.2d 1287 (2d Cir. 1977); Rupali Bank v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 403 F. Supp. 1285
(E.D. Pa. 1975) (relying on defendant's expert witness on Pakistan and Bangladesh
law to determine jurisdiction).
50. See, e.g., Ziadeh, Law of Property in Eqypt: Real Rights, 26 AM. J. CoMP. L.
239, 245-46 (1978) (describing the mixed sources of Egypt's Civil Code). In the main,
Syria, Iraq, and Libya have followed the Egyptian example. Lmazsar, supra note 5,
at 94. British common law principles influenced greatly modern Pakistan and India.
LInmSNy, supra note 5, at 118.
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American courts are more reluctant to apply the substantive
foreign law to the issues before them. The cases below illus-
trate these principles.
Rupali Bank v. Provident National Bank,"1 is an example
of the manner in which one federal court interpreted the law
of an Islamic nation according to common law principles. In
Rupali, the Muslim Commercial Bank, headquartered in Ka-
rachi, West Pakistan, arranged with the Provident National
Bank in the United States to collect the proceeds from certain
export transactions between an American importer and an
East Pakistani exporter.52 During the course of these transac-
tions, Bangladesh achieved its independence from Pakistan.
Subsequently, Bangladesh nationalized the East Pakistani
branch of the Muslim Commercial Bank and all of its assets
became vested in the Rupali Bank of Bangladesh. 8 Rupali
Bank claimed that, pursuant to a power of attorney issued to
certain employees of the Muslim Commercial Bank, Provident
was notified to dispose of Muslim Commercial's dollar account
for the benefit of Rupali Bank.54
When Provident refused, Rupali brought suit in the District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The court de-
nied Rupali's claim and held, inter alia, that "the law of Paki-
stan and Bangladesh is derived from the English common
law."85 The court concluded that under Pakistani and Ban-
gladesh law, an agent cannot act contrary to the best interests
of his principal." The judge noted that the same common law
rule of agency was equally valid in the State of
51. 403 F. Supp. 1285 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
52. Provident National Bank was to deposit the proceeds in a dollar account in the
name of the Muslim Commercial Bank. The East Pakistani exporter of jute financed
his transactions through the Muslim Commercial Bank by borrowing a sum which
would be covered by the proceeds collected from the American importer upon deliv-
ery. The exporter delivered the appropriate export bills of lading and documentary
drafts to the East Pakistani branch of the Muslim Commercial Bank. These docu-
ments were forwarded to Provident National Bank which then credited the appropri-
ate amounts to the Muslim Commercial Bank's account. 403 F. Supp. at 1287-88.
53. Id. at 1288.
54. Id. at 1289.
55. Id. at 1290.
56. Id. as 1291. The judge stated that he had relied upon the testimony of the
defendant's legal expert to inform him of the rule in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Id.
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Pennsylvania.'
Likewise, inasmuch as American judges have frequently had
to apply European law, one should expect little difficulty in
interpreting the law of Islamic countries whose statues are
codified according to continental principles. Many countries,
however, have codes which are influenced both by European
law and Islamic law. Where the issue before an American
courtconcerns only the European based part of the law, there
are few problems in successfully pleading the foreign law, es-
pecially when an expert witness can give a clear exposition of
its content.
In monarchical Iran, for example, the Civil Code was a mix-
ture of rules derived from Islamic and European sources.58
The primary basis of the Commercial Code, on the other
hand, was on the law of France and other Latin countries.8 In
1976 a federal district judge in New York City was called upon
to decide whether the director of an Iranian company had the
legal capacity to bring an action in the company's name after
the company had been dissolved by force of law. 0 The district
judge scrutinized the 1932 Commercial Code of Iran and con-
fessed that his first inclination was to interpret the code as
giving directors the right to carry out liquidation proceedings
as well as the concomitant right to become liquidators with
the capacity to defend actions against the company." None-
theless, the court relied on the affidavits of an expert witness
and decided that, under the 1932 Commercial Code, a director
cannot initiate liquidation proceedings without shareholder
approval.62 The director in question, therefore, could not be-
come a liquidator with a right to represent the company.63
57. Id.
58. Liebesny, Stability and Change in Islamic Law, 21 MIDDLE E.J. 16, 30 (1967).
59. 1 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ComTAAIA'vE LAW 149-51 (1972).
60. Aloajo v. Iranian Shipping Lines, S.A., 426 F. Supp. 687 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd,
573 F.2d 1287 (2d Cir. 1977).
61. Id. at 689.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 689. The court also found that, unlike the normal practice in the United
States, the 1932 Commercial Code of Iran does not permit a director to remain in
office beyond his term even if no replacement director has been elected. Id. at 690.
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In Hunt v. Coastal States Gas Producing Company, 4 a
Texas Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the trial court
that a Libyan petroleum concession to Nelson Baker Hunt did
not, according to Libyan law, grant Hunt any title to unex-
tracted oil. In a trial replete with experts,65 the defendants
successfully argued that similarities existed between Libyan
law and Italian, French, and general Civil Code principles on
the nature of property interests." In addition, the appeals
judge relied on the plain meaning of the Libyan statute in
question to defeat the claim of the appellant.6 7 In reality, Lib-
yan property law contains certain principles of Islamic law in-
corporated into the modern code.6' The fact that they were
not discovered or brought to light insulated the court from
having to contend with an unfamiliar body of law.
When an American court enters an area in which Islamic
and European principles are definitely intertwined, its confi-
dence in reaching a correct apprehension of the law rapidly
evaporates. A federal district court recently dismissed a suit
on grounds of forum non conveniens precisely on that basis."
In that case, the plaintiff sued Gulf Oil Corporation for breach
of contract.70 The plaintiff alleged that Gulf had induced its
subsidiary in Iran to turn over its shares to the government-
owned National Iranian Oil Company, thereby breaching
Gulf's contract to the plaintiff. Under the contract the plain-
tiff had a prior right to repurchase the shares at cost. 1 Even
64. 570 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 583 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Sup. Ct.
1979).
65. Brief for Appellees at 35-48, App. at 3; Hunt v. Coastal States Gas Producing
Co., 570 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 583 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1979).
66. Brief for Appellees at 22, App. at 3.
67. LIBYAN PETROLEUM LAW No. 25 (1955). The law states in pertinent part that
"[a]ll petroleum in Libya in its natural state in strata is the property of the Libyan
State." Id.
68. In classical Islamic law, for example, the state held title to mawat or "dead
lands," i.e. those lands, usually desert, outside of arable areas. Nearly all Middle
Eastern states, including Libya, have retained the category of mawat lands in their
modern codes with concomitant limitations on their ownership by private individuals.
F. ZIADEH, PROPERTY LAW IN THE ARAB WORLD, 14-18, 21-24, 54-55 (1979).
69. Farmanfarmaian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 437 F. Supp. 910 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), affd, 588
F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1978).
70. Id. at 913.
71. Id.
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though Gulf and its co-defendants were American and the
plaintiff was an Iranian citizen, Gulf moved for dismissal on
the grounds of forum non coveniens.72
Gulf had attempted to unsettle the court with the esoteric
complexity of Islamic law. Its brief argued that a federal court
was not the place "to try out novel theories of Iranian law, a
system of jurisprudence not only remote from our own, but
heavily founded upon Islamic religious tradition and en-
shrouded in a language which presents serious translation
problems. 7' The tactic succeeded. The federal district court
granted the motion.7 ' The court noted that most of the wit-
nesses would be found in Iran.75 In addition, the court
observed:
[I]t must be recognized that the validity of plaintiff's claims
must be determined under Iranian and not American law. Hav-
ing already had occasion in this case to examine Iranian law at
least preliminarily, I know from first-hand experience what a
difficult task it is to reach any conclusion as to its substance.76
The court had accepted the opinion of the plaintiff's expert
that the Iranian Civil Code was the product not only of Euro-
pean law, but also was indebted to "centuries of development
of the principles of Islamic law."'77 The court concluded that
comprehending the essence of Iranian law would take an "in-
ordinate amount of time" as its foundation was totally differ-
ent from American law.78
Another federal judge nearly found himself enmeshed in
Saudi Arabian contract law because of the manner in which
he applied New York choice of law rules. The plaintiff in the
case of Nakhleh v. Chemical Construction Co.7 9 alleged that
he had made an oral contract with the defendant under which
72. Id. at 914.
73. Brief for Defendant at 8-9; Farmanfarmaian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 437 F. Supp. 910
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), afl'd, 588 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1978).
74. Farmanfarmaian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 437 F. Supp. at 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), afl'd,
588 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1978).
75. Id. at 923-24.
76. Id. at 924.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 359 F. Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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he would intervene for the defendant in Saudi Arabian bu-
reaucratic circles in order to procure a construction contract
for the defendant.80 In return the plaintiff was to receive a fee
for his services of five percent of the contract price.8 ' The de-
fendant moved for summary judgment in the plaintiff's suit
for breach of contract.82 The court denied the motion since
there were material questions of fact which would determine
whether New York or Saudi Arabian law would apply in test-
ing the validity of the oral contract.8 3
The judge found that the choice of law rules of New York
required a "center of gravity" or "interest analysis" ap-
proach.84 Under such an analysis, New York substantive law
should govern the agreement unless the parties indicated that
they intended the law of some other jurisdiction to control the
contract.88 Of course, even if the parties had intended Saudi
law to govern, no judge sitting in New York could enforce any
agreement which violated a fundamental policy of the state. 6
Although noting that the New York Statue of Frauds8 7 re-
quires a contract like the one in suit to be in writing, the
judge found that the statute did not represent a policy so fun-
damental as to bar enforcement of an oral contract made
under Saudi law.88 The court further declared that New York
law permits parties to a contract to choose a foreign law to
govern the interpretation of a contract as well as its validity.89
Thus, the court denied the motion for summary judgment be-
cause there was a factual issue as to whether the parties had
80. Id. at 358.
81. Opinion of Defendant's Expert Ismail Nazer at 3, Nakhleh v. Chemical Con-
struction Corp., 359 F. Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
82. Id. at 358.
83. Id. at 359.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 360 (relying on RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS §187(2)(a)
(1971)) (parties' choice of law of state allowed except where it would contravene fun-
damental policy of forum state if forum state has significantly greater interest than
chosen state).
87. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. § 5-701(10) (McKinney 1974).
88. 359 F. Supp. at 360.
89. Id. at 359-60.
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intended Saudi law to control their agreement.90
With the distinct possibility that the decision would rest on
Saudi contract law, the defendant's attorneys sought expert
advice." The case was settled before trial. Yet, if there had
been a trial on the merits, the court would have had to face a
series of troublesome issues.
The validity of an oral contract under Saudi law would have
been one of the issues facing the court.2 Oral contracts are
generally valid in Islamic law, but in most instances the word-
ing of both the offer and acceptance must be framed in the
past tense; otherwise, the words are regarded only as an in-
quiry or a promise but not as an enforceable contract.'" This
requirement derives from the limited verb forms present in
the Arabic language. 4 It is uncertain whether a Saudi court
would apply the same rule to a contract made in another lan-
guage in which other verb forms could signify a proper con-
tractual intent.
Another issue confronting the court would have been
whether a contract predicated on influencing Saudi officials
was valid under Saudi law. Defendant's legal expert asserted
that it was illegal to pay an intermediary for assistance in ob-
taining a contract with the Saudi government.' 5 In addition, a
90. Id. at 360.
91. See Opinion of Expert, Nakhleh v. Chemical Construction Corp., 359 F. Supp.
357 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (73 Civ. 3618 (M.P.)) (affidavit of defendant's expert witness).
92. Opinion of Expert at 3, Nakhleh v. Chemical Construction Corp., 359 F. Supp.
357 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The plaintiff alleged the following conversation constituted the
agreement:
[Defendant]: Assuming we get a contract, what would be our obligation to you?
[Plaintiff]: The usual fee is 5% of the value of the contract. This is the custom-
ary fee in Saudi Arabia and I have important associates there.
[Defendant's associate]: That was a customary fee.
Id.
93. LissN, supra note 5, at 210.
94. Id. The rules may be simplified as follows. If both parties signify their assent to
a contract in the past tense, they have formed a contract. If one or both parties sig-
nify their assent in the present tense or in the imperative mood, an enforceable con-
tract results only if intent is shown. No contract results if one or both parties use the
future tense or an interrogative sentence. JOHN MAKDISI, COMPARATIVE LEGAL PRO-
cEss 332 (1982) (citing 3 Marghinani, Hidaya 21 (n.d.)) (Course Materials, Cleveland
State University College of Law).
95. Opinion of Expert at 5-6, Nakhleh v. Chemical Construction Corp., 359 F.
Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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circular from the Saudi Ministry of Finance and National
Economy required that all contracts had to include a declara-
tion that no fee was due to any agent for his assistance in
gaining the contract.9 6 The penalty was deduction of the
amount of the fee from the price paid by the government to
the contractor.9
Finally, it is not altogether clear whether a shari'a court ap-
plying Islamic principles would hear the case if the suit were
brought in Saudi Arabia. It is possible that such a dispute
would come before one of the Commercial Disputes Arbitra-
tion Boards which are not required to follow the shari'a.8 It
would indeed perplex an American court to deduce exactly
what law would be applied when even the forum was
questionable."
IV. APPLYING FOREIGN TORT LAW
The problems encountered by American judges discovering
Middle Eastern contract law are minor when compared to the
difficulties involved when they face issues of tort. Relatively
few tort cases involving the law of Islamic countries reach
courts in the United States.100 As will be seen below, not only
is the Islamic law of torts extremely complex and subject to
various interpretations, but even when pleaded clearly, it gen-
erally provides a plaintiff with less opportunities for recovery
than the laws of this country. Plaintiffs, therefore, will gener-
ally seek recovery under the law of an American jurisdiction.
The lessons were learned in the first and most famous such
96. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Ministry of Finance and National Economy, Circu-
lar No. 9818/4/1 (7/8/1388 A.H.).
97. Id.
98. LIEBESNY, supra note 5, at 107; ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 185.
99. The defendant's expert also emphasized the procedural requirements of the
shari'a for proving the existance of a contract. The expert focused the importance of
the competency of witnesses to an oral contract. Opinion of Expert at 4-5, Nakhleh v.
Chemical Construction Corp., 359 F. Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). This procedural re-
quirement would not have bound the federal court, however, since it is required to
apply the evidentiary rules of the forum, not of the foreign state. FED. R. EviD. 601;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 137 (1971).
100. See infra text accompanying notes 101-90 (examination of tort cases involving
Islamic law).
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tort case, Walton v. Arabian American Oil Co.'01 Walton, a
citizen of Arkansas, was injured in Saudi Arabia when his au-
tomobile collided with a truck owned by Aramco, a Delaware
corporation, licensed to do business in New York and heavily
involved in business in Saudi Arabia.' 0 ' The court indicated
that Walton would have recovered under the New York law of
torts.103 Nevertheless, although the choice of law theory of
contacts had already surfaced, the year was 1956 and the
court found that New York still adhered to the lex loci rule.
Thus, the court held that Saudi law should govern the case.'"
Despite opportunities afforded to the plaintiff by the trial
judge, the plaintiff did not bring forward any evidence of the
applicable rules of Saudi law. 05 Although at the time of trial,
foreign law had to be proven as a fact,"" the federal rules re-
quired a federal court to receive evidence admissible under
the law of the state in which it sat,10 7 and under New York
law, the courts could take judicial notice of foreign law.'"
Thus, the trial judge had the opportunity to seek out Saudi
law on his own in the same way the present federal rules per-
mit him to do. 09 Yet, in reviewing the trial court's decision,
the circuit court did not think that the failure of the trial
judge to take judicial notice of Saudi law was an abuse of dis-
cretion." 0 The appellate court hinted that, without expert
101. 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1955).
102. Id. at 542.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 546.
106. Id. at 543. Today, of course, the substance of the foreign law is treated as an
issue of law in federal courts. FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1.
107. FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a). Today Federal Rule 44.1 is the sole means for a federal
court to ascertain the foreign law. FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1.
108. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT. §344-a, now incorporated into N.Y. Ctv. PAuc. R. 4511
(McKinney 1974).
109. New York courts, however, had interpreted the permission narrowly, actually
holding that the trial judge abuses his discretion by taking judicial notice of foreign
law without pleadings when the foreign law is difficult of comprehension. Walton, 233
F.2d at 544 (citing Greener v. Freund, 286 App. Div. 996, 144 N.Y.S.2d 766 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1955)); Sonneson v. Panama Transport Co., 298 N.Y. 262, 82 N.E.2d 569
(N.Y. 1948); Berg. v. Oriental Consol. Mining Co., 70 N.Y.S.2d 19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1947) Arams v. Arams, 182 Misc. 328, 45 N.Y.S.2d 251 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1943).
110. Walton, 233 F.2d at 544.
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pleadings, a judge might easily make serious errors based on
his own inbred American legal assumptions of what the for-
eign law truly requires, particularly when the foreign legal sys-
tem is based on a different tradition."1 The practice of federal
judges today still observes that prudential warning.112
The circuit court held that where legal systems are so dif-
ferent that one cannot fairly assume common agreement on
rudimentary legal principles of tort law, the burden is on the
plaintiff to show why the foreign law allows him to recover. 11s
The court admitted that the burden would more fairly fall on
the defendant who had better access to the Saudi law, but the
court declared itself bound to follow the New York rule to the
contrary.'1 4 Plaintiff retreated to an assertion that Saudi Ara-
bia was an "uncivilized" country, a claim the court rejected
out of hand." 5
The Walton case was the object of severe criticism. Most
commentators, however, concentrated on the issue of which
party should have the burden of proving the foreign law and
on the responsibility of the forum to apply its own law when
the foreign law is neither available nor pleaded."" A few
sought to ascertain what the relevant Saudi law would have
been, with confusing results." 7
111. Id.
112. M. Pollack, Proof of Foreign Law, 26 AM. J. Comp. L. 470 (1978) (asserting
that despite Federal Rule 44.1, counsel and litigants retain responsibility for demon-
strating content of foreign country's law).
113. Id. at 545. If the legal systems were similar enough to allow a presumption of
common legal rights, then the defendant should have the responsibility of proving
that the foreign law precludes recovery. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 62-63 (1971); Currie,
On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 COLUM. L. Ray. 964 (1958) [here-
inafter cited as Currie].
117. A. VON MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTAT PROBLEMS, 100-01
(1965). Professors von Mehren and Trautman suggested the following, somewhat con-
flicting, set of findings:
1. The Saudi-Arabian courts apply the Moslem law derived from the Koran
known as the Shari'a. Under the Shari'a the concept of negligence is not known,
but a person injuring another must pay the cost of the injured person's medical
care.
2. The person causing the injury may be prosecuted criminally, and his duty to
compensate the injured person may be sanctioned by keeping the former in jail
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Apparently, Walton's attorney had made some efforts to
discover Saudi Arabian law but was stymied by the lack of
available authoritative statutes, codes, or cases, and by indica-
tions that such cases were handled administratively seemingly
until the latter recovers.
3. The court administering the Shari'a does not recognize corporations as legal
entities. If a corporation wishes to appear in a shari'a case (for example, in an
action brought by an employee), a representative (an executive or lawyer) will
appear for the corporation. The court's judgment will run against him.
4. There is a workmen's compensation law in Saudi Arabia with a scale of pay-
ments for various injuries. This is administered by an executive department of
the government.
5. Persons seriously injured other than by fellow servants may apply to the
government for administrative relief. If the executive department feels that the
case is a suitable one, it will order the person causing the injury not only to pay
the cost of medical care but also amounts determined by reference to the work-
men's compensation scale. The amount to be paid may be increased or decreased
by reference to the executive department's view of the "defendant's" fault.
There are no rules or principles governing this award.
6. The executive department in a complex case (for example, a collision be-
tween two cars) may require that the party seeking relief prove the facts of the
accident before the Shari'a court. If this is done, the court will apply the strict
Shari'a rules governing proof. These require facts to be proved by the testimony
of two witnesses. The court will report the facts found to the executive depart-
ment, which will determine its action in the Koran (and other religious sources),
it does not include the rules of the road in force in Saudi Arabia. Though ig-
nored by the court, these can be taken into account by the executive department
in passing on the facts found by the court.
7. If a foreigner appeared before a Shari'a court and asked that his national law
be applied to the case, the court would refuse to entertain the case.
8. In controversies involving foreigners the aid of the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs is sometimes sought. However, it would not attempt to handle a running-
down case between foreigners.
Id.
Professor Currie confessed that his efforts to discover the relevant Saudi Arabian
law "had little success." Currie, supra note 116, at 1000. He incorrectly suggested
that "if the Walton case had been brought before a Muslim qadi, he might have
refused to assume jurisdiction over two non-believers, or would have attempted to
apply the national law of the litigants." Id. at 1000, n.101. It is a surprising state-
ment, for even if it were true, it is a species of renvoi which would not likely have
been applied by the federal court sitting in New York applying New York choice of
law rules. Roger v. National Ass'n of Bedding Mfrs. Group Ins. Trust Fund, 372
N.Y.S.2d 97, 83 Misc.2d 527 (1975) (renvoi usually limited to land title and divorce
cases).
Finally, Professor Joseph Schacht offered a creative opinion that "without recourse
to anything resembling the common-law doctrine of respondeat superior, Saudi Ara-
bian law would fix responsibility upon the corporate employer for injuries acciden-
tally inflicted by the employee, by analogy to an established practice of fixing such
responsibility apon the members of the culprit's tribe." Currie, supra note 116, at
1000 n.101.
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on an ad hoc basis." 8 He also believed the costs for a full in-
vestigation of Saudi law would be prohibitive. Finally, he sus-
pected that the rules in that country were far less favorable to
his client than those of the forum." 9
Walton's attorney was perceptive. Some years later another
plaintiff actually attempted to have her claim adjudicated
under Saudi Arabian law.120 She succeeded, but then saw her
case evaporate.
Plaintiff brought her suit in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York for the wrongful
death of her husband."'2 The decedent spouse had never been
a resident of New York and had worked for thirteen years in
Saudi Arabia.12 In 1963 he became ill at his job and allegedly
received negligent treatment by a physician employed by the
defendant."12 The plaintiff's spouse was taken to Lebanon
where he died."14 The defendant, Trans Arabian Pipeline, was
a Delaware corporation having its principal place of business
in Beirut."15 Its contacts with New York were minimal. Al-
though the decedent had agreed at the time of his employ-
ment that the New York Workmen's Compensation Law
would apply in case of personal injury, the court found that
the weight of contacts required the application of Saudi law,
the contractual agreement notwithstanding."16
Plaintiff argued for the application of Saudi law because
New York's statute of limitations would have barred her suit.
The law of Saudi Arabia would not have recognized such a
lapse in time as fatal."17 From the transcript, one can infer
that the court held the limitation question an "important"
118. R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIB, & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 55 (2d ed. 1975).
119. Id.
120. Terry v. Trans Arabia Pipeline, No. 66 Civ. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), reported in
S. Hassan, Seminar in Islamic Law and Middle Eastern Legal Institutions 34 (Part
1, 1975) (Course Materials, Columbia Law School) [hereinafter cited as Hassan].
121. Id. at 42.
122. Id. at 34.
123. Id. at 42.
124. Id. at 35.
125. Id. at 34-35, 42.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 37.
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procedural issue more properly controlled by the foreign law,
and argument proceeded on the substantive claim. " "
The parties stipulated a number of legal points which would
have had interesting implications in Islamic law. For example,
they agreed that the decedent's wife had capacity to bring
suit.129 Under Islamic law, all heirs of the deceased, either
sharers or residuaries, have a right to make a claim.' " Thus
this stipulation was correct. The parties also stipulated that
recovery would be gauged according to the standard of com-
parative negligence and not barred by the doctrine of contrib-
utory negligence.' 3 ' Exemplified here are the peculiar difficul-
ties in seeking "concepts" in a casuistical legal system. In
Islamic law, there is no "concept" in the true sense of the
term of either contributory or comparative negligence. If any-
thing, a wrongful death action points to strict liability. "' In a
literature replete with examples serving as archetypes, one
can find instances which point to one idea or another. 13
The parties did not stipulate whether the legal cause of
death was willful homicide, quasi-willful homicide, or acciden-
tal homicide.'" Yet, one can infer from the facts that it was a
128. Id.
129. Id. at 36.
130. LmsNY, supra note 5, at 231. The Maliki school limits the capacity to sue to
male heirs, but Saudi Arabia follows the Hanbali school. Id. at 231, 107.
131. Hassan, supra note 120, at 37.
132. SCHACHT, supra note 1, at 187. Much of the structure of the classical Islamic
law of wrongful death was taken over from pre-Islamic Arabia. There a homicide was
followed by retaliation against the perpetrator by the kinsmen of the victim, or a
blood feud against the perpetrator's tribe, or by compensatory payment to the vic-
tim's kinsmen. P. HrrrI, HISTORY OF THE Aiuns 26 (10th ed. 1970).
133. See ImmESNY, supra note 5, at 33 (citing AsU Yusut, Krrs AL-KHARAJ 96-97
(1855)). Abu Yusuf gives an example seemingly from a species of contributory negli-
gence. "If a man falls into the pit but remains safe and sound and then tries to climb
out, reaches a certain height, and falls back and dies, the owner of the pit is not
responsible because he was not there to push the person down." LInEsENY, supra note
5, at 33 (citing ABu Yusut, KrrIA AL-KHARAJ 96-97 (1885)).
134. The elements for willful homicide are an action resulting in death undertaken
with no legal excuse, and with the intention to wound or kill by means of an instru-
ment that normally causes death. The elements for quasi-willful homicide are the
same but with an instrument not normally known to be fatal. Accidental homicide
occurs where the offender did not intend to kill a person, or where he did intend to
kill a person 'ut believed that he was acting legally. Forte, Comparative Criminal
Law: Islam, reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE (in press) (1983).
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case of accidental homicide. 13 5 In addition, the court focused
on the penalty of 100 camels of lesser value, the prescribed
blood money for accidental homicide in classical Islamic
law.' 6
Turning to the contested issues, the court heard testimony
from expert witnesses on both sides.13 7 It held that the law of
Saudi Arabia does not share the Anglo-American concept of
respondeat superior.38 While such conceptualizations are not
in the vocabulary of the Islamic law of torts, there are exam-
ples in the writings of the jurists showing that a master is lia-
ble for the wrong committed by his servant. 39 Nonetheless,
the court decided that respondeat superior did not exist in
Islamic law and did not attempt to analogize such liability
from available examples found in Islamic writings.1 40 Because
of the absence of the doctrine of respondeat superior, the
court dismissed the case against Trans Arabian Pipeline.' 4 '
Only the negligent doctor could have been held liable, and
under traditional Islamic law, not the perpetrator himself, but
his kinsmen. However, the court did not attempt to connect
the modern corporation with the ancient social structure of
the clan.142 Alternatively, the court dismissed the case because
the obligatory payment for this form of wrongful death was
the equivalent of 100 camels or $3,600, a sum below the juris-
dictional amount required for a suit in federal court.1 43
Plaintiff's attorney argued that the court should ignore the
monetary limit. "I cannot accept," he said, "the basic proposi-
tion that what was adequate to compensate for the death of a
135. See Hassan, supra note 120, at 42.
136. Compare Hassan, supra note 120, at 40 (one hundred camels are valued at
$3,600) with LIEBESNY, supra note 5, at 232 (intentional homicide calls for camels
worth $3,900 while accidental homicide calls for camels worth $3,500).
137. Hassan, supra note 120, at 40.
138. Hassan, supra note 120, at 40.
139. LIEBESNY, supra note 5, at 218.
140. Hassan, supra note 120, at 43.
141. Hassan, supra note 120, at 43.
142. LIEBESNY, supra note 5, at 231 (citing AL-MAWARDI, AL-ANKAM AL SULTANIYYA
231-33 (n.d.)).
143. Hassan, supra note 120, at 43. Ten thousand dollars is the minimum amount
sufficient to invoke federal court jurisdiction in cases involving diversity of citizen-
ship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982).
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man in 1200 is the same thing that is adequate to compensate
a man for his death in 1963. It is an unacceptable concept for
a civilized nation. '144 The court pointed out that wrongful
death is a statutory reform of the common law and that mon-
etary limitations are common in the law of many states. 14 5
Finally, the plaintiff attempted to assert the questionable
proposition that Islamic law permitted moral damages for
pain and suffering. '6 The court rejected the claim, holding
that the plaintiff had neither properly put into evidence nor
properly argued the proposition that Saudi Arabian law per-
mitted damages for pain and suffering. 147
In another case, a federal court reacted to the criticisms
which had been leveled at the Walton decision by trying to
avoid any reliance on the foreign law altogether. In 1971, the
case of Couch v. Mobil Oil Corp. reached a United States Dis-
trict Court in Texas.1 48 The facts of Couch paralleled Walton
to a remarkable degree, except that the foreign law at issue
was Libyan.1'4 The Libyan substantive law in question arose
from its civil code derived in large measure from European
sources.150 The district judge reviewed the relevant provisions
and commented that Libyan law allowed judicial discretion in
the awarding of damages in a manner much like that accorded
federal judges in the United States. 51 Yet the judge stead-
fastly refused to apply Libyan law and he used all the argu-
ments he could muster to avoid that choice. It is fair to say
that some of his points were tenuous.
The court began by applying the choice of law rules of
Texas, the state in which it sat. Texas apparently clung to the
144. Hassan, supra note 120, at 38.
145. Hassan, supra note 120, at 39.
146. Hassan, supra note 120, at 40.
147. Hassan, supra note 120, at 43-46. The Saudi Labor and Workmen Regulations
of 1969, however, provide for moral damages in some cases, such as when an employer
arbitrarily breaches a labor contract. Ls NY, supra note 5, at 108, 222.
148. Couch v. Mobil Oil Corp., 327 F. Supp. 897 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
149. Plaintiff, a resident of Texas, worked for a subcontractor of Mobil Oil Corp., a
Delaware corporation, in Libya where he was injured by an oil tank explosion. Alleg-
edly, a Mobil employee negligently turned on a valve emitting gases while welders
were still working. Id. at 898.
150. Id. at 901.
151. Id.
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lex loci delicti rule which would have compelled the applica-
tion of Libyan law.152 To rid itself of this burden, the court
noted that the Texas rule had been enunciated in a wrongful
death action and that there was no requirement to extend the
lex loci rule to a case involving personal injury.153
Freeing itself from the Texas lex loci rule, the court turned
to the law of California, asserted by plaintiff to be control-
ling."" Mobil had accepted, as part of its subcontract with
plaintiff's employer, an agreement between the plaintiff and
the subcontractor stating that the California Workmen's Com-
pensation Insurance Law would be the exclusive remedy for
injuries received. 15 5 Finding that Mobil was bound by the
agreement, the federal judge asserted that this brought the
case not only under the California Workmen's Compensation
law, but under the California law of conflicts as well.15" Pro-
ceeding further, the judge declared that California used both
interest analysis and the weighing of contacts to decide choice
of law questions. 5 7 This analysis permitted the judge to dis-
pose of one rule of Libyan law relied upon by the plaintiffs.
Since both California and Texas each had a greater interest in
the application of their rule of contributory negligence than
did Libya in its rule of comparative negligence, the defense of
contributory negligence would be permitted. 5 8
The district judge, however, was determined to displace
Libyan law altogether. He next found that Texas had more
contacts with the parties than either California or Libya. By
this expansive use of renvoi, the federal judge declared that
Texas substantive law had to apply.159
The court did not, however, end its argument there. It fur-
ther decided that Libya embraced the "antiquated doctrine"
152. Id. at 900 (citing Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex.
1968)).
153. Couch, 327 F. Supp. at 900.
154. Id. at 901.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 901-02.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 902.
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of volente non fit injuria, that is to say, the plaintiff, through
its employer, had the legal duty of "supervision at its own
risk" at the worksite of possible negligent action by third par-
ties. Thus, Libyan law would bar a suit by the plaintiff against
Mobil."' Texas law contains the same doctrine but limits this
assumption of risk to relations between the employee and em-
ployer only.'16 The judge declared that since Texas does not
extend the rule to negligent action by third parties, the Lib-
yan rule is contrary to the fundamental public policy of
Texas.
162
Finally, the court raised a last barrier against the Libyan
legal system. "In the interest of effective justice," it stated,
"this court should not apply Libyan law, for the complexities
of interpreting the laws of a country that is in political up-
heaval and unrest is tenuous at best. ' 163 It is not clear
whether the judge was suggesting that political upheaval leads
to arbitrariness in the administration of the law, and thus is
contrary to American requirements of due process, or whether
he meant that the substance of the rules is in indeterminate
flux. In any event, he had suggested a new and interesting bar
against applying the law of the volatile states in the Middle
East.
The intractable problems which an American judge faces in
attempting to contend with Islamic law are perhaps most ap-
parent in Bakhshandeh v. American Cyanamid Co.'" Plain-
tiff Bakhshandeh, a citizen and resident of Iran, was an im-
porter and distributor of drugs manufactured by defendant's
pharmaceutical division. Defendant was incorporated in
Maine with its principal offices in New York City.1 "5 Bakh-
160. Id. (citing Wood v. Kane Boiler, 150 TeL 191, 238 S.W.2d 172 (1951)).
161. Couch, 327 F. Supp. at 902.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 903. In addition, the court declared that "it would be a denial of justice
to close the doors of this court to an American plaintiff suing an American company,
and require him to travel halfway around the world to find a forum." Id. at 904-05. It
was a strange statement inasmuch as the issue at bar seemed to be the applicability
of Libyan law, not whether the suit should be dismissed on the grounds of forum non
conveniens. Id. at 903.
164. 211 F. Supp. 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
165. Id. at 804-05.
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shandeh alleged that, in 1951, defendant's representative in
Teheran maliciously defamed him by stating that he bribed
Iranian doctors to purchase his drugs, and that "he sold bot-
tles of Aureomycin which in fact did not contain Aureomycin
but were filled with some other harmless drug."1 " Bakh-
shandeh brought suit for $500,000 in damages in the federal
district court in New York.167 The judge, operating under the
older New York rules then in force, declared that the law of
Iran was to apply under the theory of lex loci delicti and that
the law had to be proven as a fact. ' 68 Since the judge was sit-
ting as fact-finder, however, the actual procedure used in rely-
ing upon expert witnesses was similar to the present federal
practice.
Plaintiff's expert claimed that Iranian law was merely a
codification of Islamic law and that no law could be passed by
the Iranian parliament which was contrary to Islamic law.1 "9
He also asserted that Iranian judges were not European
trained. 170 Defendant's expert admitted that the Civil Code of
Iran was largely Islamic, but that the Penal Code and the
Code of Criminal Procedure were based on the French
model.1 1 In addition, he asserted that many judges in Iran
had been educated in France. 17' The judge had to decide,
therefore, whether to interpret Iranian code provisions accord-
ing to the norms of Islamic law, French law, or both.
The court was soon hopelessly tangled in a thicket of
strained interpretations. For example, the court had to deter-
mine whether the corporation was liable for the acts of its em-
ployee. The defendant argued that an Iranian law passed in
1960 which established the doctrine of respondeat superior
could not be applied retroactively to events occurring in 1951
and that Article 4 of the Iranian Civil Code prohibited the
166. Id. at 805.
167. Id. at 804.
168. Id. at 805-06.
169. Trial Transcript at 526, 638, Couch.
170. Id. at 1388.
171. Id. at 989-90.
172. Reply Brief for Plaintiff at 7, Bakhshandeh v. American Cyanamid Co., 211 F.
Supp. 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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retroactive application of the laws. In addition, the defendant
argued that with few exceptions fixing tribal responsibility, Is-
lamic law fastens liability on the individual.17 The plaintiff
countered that the doctrine of respodeat superior existed in
Iranian law as early as 1951, despite the later passage of a law
explicity establishing the principle. Furthermore, the plaintiff
argued ingeniously that the Iranian Commercial Code made
corporations juristic personalities, and that since the Civil
Code made individual principals liable for the actions of their
agents, the two codes together created corporate responsibility
for the tortious acts of employees.
17 4
Another issue facing the court was whether an action for
slander could be maintained under Iranian law. A 1959 Law of
Civil Responsibility permitted recovery for slander. 7 The
plaintiff once again asserted that the law merely made explicit
a pre-existing right to material and moral damages present in
the Islamic precept that "there can be no loss without com-
pensation."17 He also asserted that this precept was implicit
in Sections 328 and 331 of the Iranian Civil Code which pro-
tects property against destruction by another.17 7 The defen-
dant countered by saying that there were no moral damages in
Islamic law and that the cited Iranian Civil Code provisions
provided remedies only for negligent damages to real prop-
erty. The defendant further rebuked plaintiff's argument by
stating that Islamic law had no civil remedy for slander and
that the precept relied upon by the plaintiff acted only to sub-
stitute money damages for talion in cases of actual harm.17 8
The plaintiff put forward an alternative argument in favor
of his position that slander was an offense under Iranian laws.
He noted that Section 269 of the Iranian Penal Code, in force
in 1951, made it a crime falsely to attribute in a public gather-
ing a criminal act to another. 17 The plaintiff asserted that a
173. Trial Transcript at 1014-17; Brief for Defendant at 12, Bakhshandeh.
174. Plaintiff's Reply Brief at 6. Trial Transcript at 533, Bakhshandeh.
175. Bakhshandeh, 211 F. Supp. at 811.
176. Reply Brief for Plaintiff at 5, Bakhshandeh.
177. Id.
178. Brief for Defendant at 9-11, Bahhshandeh.
179. Brief for Plaintiff at 34, Bakhshandeh.
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corporation could be prosecuted under Section 269 and fur-
ther, by operation of Sections 1-17 of the Iranian Code of
Criminal Procedure, a civil tort action could be attached to a
criminal prosecution. 180 The suggested procedure was adopted
from French criminal procedure, and from his silence on the
matter, one can infer that the plaintiff's expert did not regard
it as contrary to the requirements of Islamic law.
The defendant argued that only a criminal prosecution, and
not a civil suit, could be used in cases of defamation.1 81 He
asserted that in Islamic law, the only "payment" for the moral
damage of slander was by discretionary penal punishment
(ta'zir), not by compensation. 1 ' Finally, the defendant's ex-
pert testified that Penal Code Section 269 required the slan-
der be spoken at a public meeting and not merely at a private
gathering.1 83 In any event, there was the evidence profferred
that corporations were not liable under Section 269.18
With shifting and uncertain references to Islamic and
French law, the judge could not help but be confused. In addi-
tion, the judge became frustrated by the manner in which the
opposing experts testified. Plaintiff's witness lost credibility
when he asserted that all of Iranian code law was Islamic and
when he offered simple maxims as dispositive of the legal is-
sue.188 Defendant's witness launched into extended back-
ground lectures in response to the most narrow questions.'"
He must also have confirmed a likely suspicion that it was im-
possible to ascertain the law when he stated, "Moslem law is
very vast, your honor, and therefore I don't think anybody
can pretend, living or dead, that he was able to have all the
law or that he possessed it.' '1 87
The court dismissed the action because the plaintiff had
failed to offer any real proof that the slanderous statements
180. Id. at 35-36.
181. Reply Brief of Plaintiff at 2, citing Brief for Defendant at 58, Bakhshandeh.
182. Trial Transcript at 1009, Bakhshandeh.
183. Brief for Defendant at 11, Bakhshandeh.
184. Id. at 12.
185. Trial Transcript at 634, 636, Bakhshandeh.
186. Id. at 965-66, 978-80.
187. Id. at 1068.
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ever took place.1 The judge found that Section 269 of the
Penal Code was an insufficient basis for the action.1 8 Finally,
the judge declared that in regard to any other possible actions
"based in general Islamic principles . .. [t]he testimony of
both plaintiff's expert and defendant's expert in this connec-
tion left much to be desired."1
V. CONCLUSION
This survey of contract and tort cases demonstrates the ex-
traordinary difficulty in pleading Islamic law in American
courts. There are, in fact, remarkably few such cases which
have been reported. One might expect that with the continu-
ing demise of the lex loci choice of law standard, there will be
even more instances of a forum applying its own law rather
than the foreign law, notwithstanding the increased contact of
Americans with Islamic countries. Even within the limited
number of reported cases, one finds that in none of them did
the plaintiff recover on the basis of Islamic law, even when he
sought to have his claim adjudicated on that ground.
Thus, if there are more opportunities to recover under
American law, few plaintiffs will seek to have the court apply
foreign law, particularly when the foreign law is significantly
Islamic and not continental. In addition, even when a party
pleads a foreign law with Islamic content, American judges
will tend not to take judicial notice of the law, despite recent
statutory permissions to do so. Judges continue to rely heavily
on expert witnesses, even when, as in the Bakhshandeh case,
it leads to frustration. The root cause of the frustration and
the root cause of why Islamic law is so extraordinarily difficult
to prove lies in the vastly different natures of the common law
legal system and the Islamic legal system. In the former, the
judge articulates, refines, applies, and projects the law beyond
the instant case. In the latter, the judge primarily applies the
law. In a common law jurisdiction, there are authoritative
sources in statutes, high court opinions of a particular juris-
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diction, and regulations. Under Islamic law, authoritative
sources are found in a mass of juristic writings. In a common
law system, and a civil law system as well, law is a series of
hierarchical norms. In the Islamic system, law is a series of
maxims, examples, and mandates developed through a sophis-
ticated casuistical system. Like the legal system of ancient
Rome, Islamic law does not possess the same kind of vocabu-
lary of conceptualization as does Western law.
Consider a common law judge questioning an expert in Is-
lamic law. The judge is told that Islamic law is unchanging.
When he asks for a rule, he is told a maxim. When he asks for
examples to help him concretize the maxim, he is told con-
trary examples. When he searches for an authoritative princi-
ple to order the separate items of law that are told to him,
none is provided.
Expert witnesses could improve the chances of a judge ac-
cepting Islamic law. A good presentation of the law of an Is-
lamic state will rely on statutes and codes where possible.
Since cases do not normally have precedential authority, the
expert should seek alternatives such as fatwas (authoritative
legal opinions by jurists). Where possible, the expert should
seek to describe Islamic law principles in a vocabulary com-
prehensible to a common law judge, e.g., by stating a compre-
hensive norm supported by illustrative examples.
Nonetheless, the common law judge remains constrained by
his own system of adjudication. Not only does he apply the
law, he also states it. Yet, he becomes hesitant when he is
asked to apply an asserted principle of Islamic law unless he
is certain that it truly represents the accepted view and is not
some imaginative interpretation. Thus, in interpreting Islamic
law, the American judge is more reluctant than a qadi would
be in choosing between opposing casuistical arguments in the
same kind of case. Ironically, the American judge is also far
more restrained in a case involving Islamic law than he would
be in articulating American law subject to differing interpreta-
tions. In considering these factors together, viz., the new
choice of law rules more favorable to the law of the forum, the
less likelihood of recovery under Islamic law, the differing na-
tures of the two legal systems, and the innate caution of the
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American judge in articulating foreign law, it is fair to con-
clude that Islamic law will, for the most part, continue to be
an entity inaccessible to American courts.

